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in the present case was checked in accordance with facilities offered
and provided by the defendant for that purpose, and accepted and
held in the exclusive possession of the defendant in its capacity as a
carrier.3 ' The majority opinion was a correct statement of the law,
and there seems little ground in support of the minority view.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
FEDERAL IMMUNITY FROM STATE INSPECTION LAWS
The Florida Commercial Fertilizer Law' requires an inspection
fee for all commercial fertilizers used in the state, and unless each
bag sold bears the stamp of approval, it is made subject to seizure
and destruction by the sheriff of the county where found.2 For pur-
poses of carrying out the National Soil Conservation Program,8 the
United States, acting through the Secretary of Agriculture, bought
fertilizer outside Florida and shipped it into the state for distri-
bution without state inspection. The Florida Commissioner of Agri-
culture ordered county agricultural associations to stop distribution.
The United States was given an injunction in the district court4 and
defendants appeal. Held, affirmed. The Florida regulation was
made in the exercise of its police power and as such, it does not
extend to the Federal government; its property and transactions are
immune from state police power. Mayo et al. v. United States, 63
Sup. Ct. 1137 (1943).
There can be no doubt that a state can, in the exercise of its
general police power, pass regulatory acts providing for inspection
fee5 so long as the fees are reasonably proportionate to the expenses
31. The dissenting opinion cites Hasbrouck v. New York Central &
H.R.R.R., 202 N.Y. 363, 95 N.E. 808 (1911), as sustaining
its argument to the effect that there was a bailment for a special
purpose, not subject to the contract limitation. Here a suitcase
was intrusted to a trainman to set off at the next stop. When
the plaintiff later opened the bag she found some of her property
had been stolen. Held, the valuation agreement did not apply.
Possession of defendant was not that of a carrier, because the
suitcase had not been checked as baggage nor intrusted to it for
the journey, but only for the special purpose of aiding a passenger
to get the train. Similarly it has been held that the contract pro-
visions in a steamship ticket did not apply to baggage intended
to be taken by the passenger to her stateroom for use during the
voyage, but applied only to baggage left in exclusive control of
the carrier, for which insurance liability existed at common law.
Holmes v. North German Lloyd S.S. Co., 184 N.Y. 280, 77 N.E.
21 (1906). But cf. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R.R. v. Dettlebach,
239 U.S. 588 (1916), cited supra note 25.
1. Fla. Stat. (1941) c. 576. See particularly §576.11.
2. Id. §576.15.
3. Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, 49 Stat. 163, 16
U.S.C.A. 590 (1935).
4. United States v. Mayo et al., 47 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Fla. 1942).
5. U.S. Const. Art. I, §10. " . . . no State shall, without the con-
sent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or ex-
ports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
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incurred in administering the inspection details,6 and if some social
interest can be found sufficient to justify such an exercise. . The
social interest in this case was in the prohibition of inferior fertilizers
so the statute seems perfectly proper as applied to any property other
than that of the federal government.
However, state powers, except in a few cases, do not extend to
the United States or its property,9 or to federal agencies where it
affects the federal power under our dual form of governmnent.'0 Neither
its inspection laws." Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933);
Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U.S. 466 (1922); Red "C" Oil Co. v.
North Carolina, 222 U.S. 380 (1912); Postal Tel. Co. v. New
Hope, 192 U.S. 55 (1904); Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina,
171 U.S. 345 (1898); Turner v.-Maryland, 107 U.S, 38 (1882).
6. Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U.S. 466 (1922); Postal Tel. Co. v.
New Hope, 192 U.S. 55 (1904); Patapsco Guano Co. v. North
Carolina, 171 U.S. 345 (1898).
7. Willis, "Constitutional Law" (1936) 728. "There are two main
requirements for a proper exercise of the police power: (1)
there must be a social interest to be protected which is more
important than the social interest in personal liberty, and (2)
there must be, as a means for the accomplishing of this end,
something which bears a substantial relation thereto."
8. Waller, J., dissenting in United States v. Mayo et al, 47 F. Supp.
552, 557 (N.D. Fla. 1942). "This Florida Fertilizer Inspection
Statute is a valid exercise of the police power of the State to
protect the farmers against the sale of inferior or fraudulent
fertilizer."
9. State of Arizona v. State of California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931);
City of New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U.S. 547 (1928)
(property of the United States Housing Corporation); Hunt v.
United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1920); State of Ohio v. Thomas, 173
U.S. 276 (1899) (a soldiers home); Van Brocklin v. Tennessee,
117 U.S. 151 (1886); Union Pac. Ry. v. McShane, 22 Wall. 444
(U.S. 1874); Chalk v. United States, 114 F. (2d) 207 (C.C.A. 4th,
1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 679 (1941). See Rockwell, "Situs
of Contract for Purchase of Federal Property" (1928) 8 N.C.
L. Rev. 479. Cf. Penn Dairies, Inc. et al. v. Milk Control Comm. of
Pa., - U.S. -, 63 Sup. Ct. 617 (1943) noted in 18 Ind. L. J.
-. There ihe court allowed the Pennsylvania Milk Control
Commission to regulate prices of milk sold to a United States
army camp in Pennsylvania. However, it must be noticed that
there the federal government was operating the camp not as its
own property, but under a permit from the state, the state re-
taining jurisdiction. A companion case, Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc.
v. Dep't of Agriculture of California et al., - U.S. -, 63
Sup. Ct. 628 (1943) involved the same question, but was decided
differently because the camp was under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the federal government at the time the regulation was adopted.
10. Posey v. T.V.A., 93 F. (2d) 726 (C.C.A. 5th, 1937) (In spite
of the corporate capacity of the T.V.A. and its subjection to
suit, it was held to be a governmental agency and free from
state regulation and control); Johnson v. State of Maryland,
254 U.S. 51 (1920) (state automobile operator's competency
regulations held not to apply to an employee of the post office
department while driving a government truck on a post road
in the performance of his duties). However, where the regula-
tion affects the federal government only incidentally, it may be
upheld. James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94 (1940)
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can it interfere with federal transactions or functions,.1 and it can
not trespass upon rights vested in the federal government. 12  There-
fore, since the fertilizer was property owned by the United States
government itself, it was immune from regulation by the state in the
exercise of its police power.
It might be contended that the regulation was valid as a tax
since it has been held that a state may tax the property of private
individuals or corporations although they are operating under a
license of the federal government or are instrumentalities of the
federal government.' 3 Likewise, taxes on materials purchased under
a contract with the federal government have been upheld1" on the
theory that those who furnish supplies or render services to the
government under contract are not governmental agencies.'5
If the measure be an exercise of the police power merely dis-
guised in the form of taxation, its validity would be extremely ques-
tionable, 16 but even if it be considered a legitimate tax, it was not
levied on licenses or instrumentalities of the United States, or on
materials furnished under contract with the United States; if a tax
at all, it was a tax on property belonging to the United States itself
and as such, it would be invalid 7 unless expressly authorized by Con-
(upholding local building regulations involved in a contract to
build a post office for the government); Baltimore & A.R.R. v.
Lichtenberg, 176 Md. 383, 4 A. (2d) 734 (1939) (upholding reg-
ulations affecting operations of a trucking company in perform-
ing its contracts with the federal government to transport work-
ers employed on a P.W.A. project).
11. State of Arizona v. State of California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931);
Johnson v. State of Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 427 (U.S. 1819) (disallowing a state tax
on the activities of a bank incorporated by Congress to serve
as an instrumentality of the federal government).
12. Hanley v. Moody, 39 F. (2d) 198 (N.D. Tex. 1930).
13. Colo. Nat'l Bank v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41 (1940); Alward v.
Johnson, 282 U.S. 509 (1931) discussed in Note (1931) 44 Harv.
L. Rev. 1141. A state may tax property bought with war risk
insurance money even though such money was not exempt. Trot-
ter v. State of Tenn., 290 U.S. 354 (1933).
14. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941) discussed in Note
(1942) 40 Mich. L. Rev. 457. Cf. Graves v. New York, 306 U.S.
466 (1939) (salary for an attorney for the H.O.L.C. held subject
to state taxation).
15. See Buckstaff Bath House Co. v. McKenley, 308 U.S. 358, 359,
362 (1939); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 149
(1937); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 524, 525
1925). Cf. Susquehanna Power Co. v. State Tax Comm., 283
U.S. 291, 294 (1931); Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp.,
303 U.S. 376, 385, 386 (1938).
16. Trusler v. Crooks, 269 U.S. 475 (1926) (a tax on "future" trans-
actions in the grain market held unconstitutional); Bailey v.
Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922)
(a tax on the employment of child labor held unconstitutional).
17. See note 9 supra.
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gress.18 Thus, this particular application of the statute seems invalid
as an exercise of either the police power or the taxing power.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SCOPE OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
Respondents, a partnership, were engaged in furnishing meals
and beds to maintenance-of-way employees of a railroad. The meals
were served and beds were furnished in railway cars operated on the
railroad's tracks under a contract arrangement between respondents
and the railroad. The cars were located conveniently to the place
of the employees' work and in emergencies followed the gang to the
scene of its activities. The employees paid the respondents for these
services by authorizing the railroad company to deduct the amount due
from their wages and to pay it over to the respondents. The petitioner,
employed by respondents as a cook on one of its commissary cars and
performing all of his duties in the state of Texas, sought to recover
wages for overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act.., Held, the
petitioner was not "engaged in commerce" or in the "production of
goods for commerce" and thus does not come within the purview of the
act. McLeod v. Threlkeld, 63 Sup. Ct. 1248 (1943).
The constitutionality of a minimum wage and hour law and the
plenary power of Congress over all phases of interstate commerce have
been well established.2 The question involved, however, due to the
variance in the different statutes as to what constitutes commerce,3
is the determination of the scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
This Act embraces all persons "engaged in commerce" or "engaged in
18. Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Dep't of Agriculture of California
et al., - U.S. - , 63 Sup. Ct. 628 (1943); Baltimore Nat'l
Bank v. Tax Comm., 297 U.S. 209 (1936); Owensboro Nat'l Bank
v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664 (1899).
1. 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C.A. §201 et seq. (1938).
2. The power of Congress over interstate commerce " . is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
constitution." Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (U.S. 1824);
see also N.L.R.B. v. Planter Mfg. Co., 105 F. (2d) 750 (C.C.A.
4th, 1939); Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 303 U.S.
453 (1938). For the first cases upholding the broad aspects of
the F.L.S.A. see United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941);
Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of the Wage and Hour
Division of the Dep't of Labor, 312 U.S. 126 (1941).
3. In F.T.C. v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. 349, 35" (1941) the
Court said, "Translation of an implication drawn from the spe-
cial aspects of one statute to a totally different statute is treach-
erous business." See also Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517
(1941). Cf. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 448, 450, 29 U.S.
C.A. §152 (1935) ; Bituminous Coal Act, 50 Stat. 72, 83, 15 U.S.C.A.§828 (1937) ; Agriculture Adjustment Act, 50 Stat. 246, 7 U.S.C.A.
§601 (1937); Public Utility Holding Act, 49 Stat. 803, §1 (c), 15
U.S.C.A. §79a(c) (1935).
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